October 2015
Overview of SPACs and Latest
Trends
Joel L. Rubinstein
expenses associated with the IPO—the most significant
component of which is the underwriting discounts and
commissions—the SPAC’s sponsors typically purchase
warrants from the SPAC, for a purchase price equal to their
fair market value, in a private placement that closes
concurrently with the closing of the IPO.
A number of recent successful business combination
transactions involving special-purpose acquisition companies
(SPACs) led by prominent sponsors have driven a resurgence
Until the closing of the IPO, the SPAC cannot hold substantive
in the SPAC IPO market and an evolution in some SPAC
terms. In this article, we provide an overview of SPACs and
discuss the latest trends in SPAC structures and terms.
discussions with a business combination target. Upon the
closing of the IPO, the SPAC’s securities generally are listed
on the Nasdaq Capital Market.
Nasdaq has special listing
SPAC Basics
requiments for a SPAC, including, among others, that its initial
business combination must be with one or more businesses
SPACs are blank-check companies formed by sponsors
who believe that their experience and reputations will allow
them to identify and complete a business combination
transaction with a target company that will ultimately be a
successful public company. In their initial public offerings
(IPOs), SPACs generally offer units, each comprised of one
share of common stock and a warrant to purchase common
stock. The SPAC’s sponsors typically own 20 percent of the
SPAC’s outstanding common stock upon completion of
the IPO, comprised of the founder shares they acquired
for nominal consideration when they formed the SPAC.
An amount equal to 100 percent of the gross proceeds of the
IPO raised from public investors is placed into a trust
account administered by a third-party trustee.
The IPO
proceeds may not be released from the trust account until the
closing of the business combination or the redemption
of public shares if the SPAC is un-able to complete a
business combination within a specified timeframe, as
discussed below. In order for the SPAC to be able to pay
having an aggregate fair market value of at least 80 percent of
the value of the SPAC’s trust account, and that it must
complete a business combination within 36 months from the
effective date of its IPO registration statement, or such shorter
time as specified in its registration statement. Nasdaq listing
rules also require that the SPAC have at least 300 round lot
shareholders (i.e., holders of at least 100 shares) upon listing,
and maintain at least 300 public shareholders after listing.
Following the IPO, the SPAC begins to search for a target
business.
Under the terms of the SPAC’s organizational
documents, if the SPAC is un-able to complete a business
combination with a target business within a specified
timeframe, typically 24 months from the closing of the IPO,
it must return all money in the trust account to the SPAC’s
public stockholders, and the founder shares and warrants will
be worthless. In addition, at the time of a business
combination, the SPAC must prepare and circulate to its
shareholders a document containing information concerning
the transaction and the target company, including audited
Boston Brussels Chicago Dallas Düsseldorf Frankfurt Houston London Los Angeles Miami Milan Munich New York Orange County Paris Rome Seoul Silicon Valley Washington, D.C.
Strategic alliance with MWE China Law Offices (Shanghai)
. INSIDE M&A
historical financial statements
and
pro
forma
financial
the trust account by placing an amount equal to 105 percent or
information. This document typically is in the form of a proxy
statement, which also is filed with the U.S. Securities and
more of the gross proceeds of the offering into the trust
account, so that investors whose shares are redeemed receive
Exchange Commission (SEC) and is subject to SEC review.
Most significantly, at the time of a business combination,
each of the SPAC’s public shareholders is given the
a return on their investment. This additional cash comes from
the investment the sponsors make in the private placement
that occurs concurrently with the IPO, which, in this case, is for
opportunity to redeem its shares for a pro rata portion of
the amount in the trust account, which is generally equal to
the amount they paid in the IPO for their units.
If the target
shares of common stock, and not warrants.
SIZE OF OFFERING AND DUAL CLASS STRUCTURE
is affiliated with the SPAC’s sponsors, the SPAC generally
is required to obtain a fairness opinion as to the consideration
being paid in the transaction.
The amount that a SPAC will raise in its IPO is the subject of
much discussion when the SPAC is being formed. A general
rule of thumb is that the SPAC should raise about one-quarter
Once a business combination is completed, the post-closing
company continues to be listed on Nasdaq, subject to meeting
Nasdaq’s initial listing requirements, or it can apply to list on a
different stock exchange. The founder shares are generally
locked up for a one-year period following the business
combination, often subject to earlier release if the trading price
of the company’s stock reaches certain thresholds.
Latest Structures and Trends
SPAC SECURITIES
Most SPACs offer units in their IPO, each comprised of one
share and one warrant.
Until recently, most SPAC warrants
were exercisable for a full share of common stock. In recent
SPACs—depending on the size of the SPAC; the prominence
and track record of the sponsors; and the particular investment
bank leading the offering—the warrant may be exercisable for
a full share of common stock, one-half of one share of
common stock or even a one-third of one share of common
stock. In any case, the warrants are almost always struck “out
of the money,” so that if the per-unit offering price in the IPO is
$10, the warrants often have an exercise price of $11.50 per
full share.
In addition, the trading price which triggers the
company’s right to call the warrants for redemption historically
was often $17.50 with a full warrant.
Many SPACs that offer less than a full warrant have increased
the trading price threshold to $24 to provide additional value.
In addition, some SPACs have decided to offer just common
stock in their IPOs. In order to compensate investors for the
absence of a warrant, the sponsors of such SPACs “overfund”
2
Inside M&A | October 2015
of the expected enterprise value of its business combination
target in order to minimize the effect of the dilution resulting
from the founder shares and warrants at the time of a business
combination.
However, it is of course un-certain at the time of the IPO what
the enterprise value of the target actually will be given that a
target cannot have been identified at the outset. If it turns out
that more capital is needed to be raised by the SPAC at the
time of the business combination in order to complete the
transaction, this may come from the sale by the SPAC of
additional equity or equity-linked securities, which would dilute
the percentage ownership of the sponsors represented by their
founder shares below 20 percent.
In order to maintain that
percentage at 20 percent, some SPACs have recently
implemented a dual-class structure, in which the founder
shares are a separate class of stock that is convertible upon
the closing of the business combination into that number of
shares of the same class held by the public equal to 20
percent of the outstanding shares after giving effect to the sale
of additional equity or equity-linked securities.
WARRANT PROTECTION LANGUAGE
As noted above, the warrants (including both the public
and private placement warrants) represent potential dilution to
the shareholders of the post-business combination company.
The significance of that potential dilution in any given
transaction is generally the subject of discussion between
the SPAC and the target, and depends on the number of
shares underlying the warrants as compared to the total
number of outstanding shares upon completion of the
business combination, as well as the terms of the warrant
. INSIDE M&A
(which are struck “out of the money” and are callable by the
company only if the trading price of the stock appreciates
meaningfully). In some recent business combination
transactions, the SPAC has sought warrantholder approval of
a proposal to amend the terms of the warrants so that the
warrants are mandatorily exchanged at the closing of the
business combination for cash and/or stock, or has conducted
a tender offer for the warrants to exchange them for cash
and/or stock. As a result of these proposals, which in a
number of cases have been successful, some potential
investors in newer SPAC IPOs have insisted on including
terms that limit the ability of the SPAC to amend the warrants
in such a manner unless certain conditions are met.
TERM OF THE SPAC
Many SPACs historically have had their terms set at a specific
number of months (e.g., 18 or 21 months) with an automatic
extension for an additional number of months (e.g., an
additional three or six months) if the SPAC has entered into
a non-binding letter of intent prior to the initial expiration date.
Given the relatively low bar of a non-binding letter of intent
for an extension, some recent SPACs have eliminated the
initial expiration date, and just have a flat 24-month (or more or
less) term.
REQUIREMENTS FOR REDEMPTIONS
Creative Business Combination
Structures Allow SPACs to
Successfully Compete With
Non-SPAC Bidders
Heidi J. Steele
Certain structural features of special-purpose acquisition
companies (SPACs) that offer benefits to their public investors
often put SPACs at a competitive dis-advantage when they are
among multiple bidders for a target company.
Recent SPAC
business combination transactions demonstrate, however, that
careful structuring of a transaction to meet the needs of the
target’s owners can overcome these structural challenges and
level the playing field for SPACs in a competitive bidding
process.
SPAC Structure
The hallmark feature of the SPAC structure is that the gross
proceeds of the SPAC’s initial public offering (IPO) are placed
into a trust account for the benefit of the SPAC’s public
stockholders. The public stockholders have a right to receive
their pro rata share of the trust account if they choose to
redeem their common stock in connection with the SPAC’s
intial business combination transaction, or if the SPAC is un-
In the past, SPACs would require public shareholders to vote
against the business combination transaction in order to
redeem their shares. In recent SPACs, this requirement has
able to complete an initial business combination within a
specified period of time, generally 24 months from the closing
of the IPO.
The cash in the trust account cannot be accessed
been removed, so that a shareholder can redeem even if it
votes in favor of the business combination transaction. Some
SPACs still require shareholders to vote, either in favor or
until the SPAC’s initial business combination is closed. Only a
limited amount of additional cash is invested in the SPAC by
its sponsors and held outside the trust account to pay the
against the transaction, in order to redeem their shares.
However, this requirement may make some investors reluctant
to purchase shares in the open market after the
SPAC’s expenses in connection with identifying, investigating,
negotiating and closing its initial business combination
transaction.
announcement of a business combination transaction and
after the record date for the shareholder vote on the
transaction, because they would not obtain the ability to vote
and, hence, redeem their shares.
The Appeal of SPACs
For the SPAC’s public investors, the trust account structure is
intended to eliminate the downside risk of their investment.
If
the SPAC fails to complete a business combination transaction
within the specified time period, or if an investor redeems its
shares in connection with the SPAC’s initial business
combination transaction, the investor receives substantially all
of its initial investment back. For target companies, a SPAC’s
Inside M&A | October 2015
3
. INSIDE M&A
public company status allows them to go public more quickly
than the timing of a traditional public offering. It also provides a
path to go public for companies whose stories may not be
appreciated by public market investors. Perhaps more
significantly, a business combination transaction with a SPAC
provides a significant amount of flexibility for the target’s
owners to receive a portion of their business combination
consideration in cash and a portion in public company stock,
which will allow them to participate in the future growth of the
business.
The SPAC Challenges
While the SPAC structure provides public investors with
safeguards to protect their investment, it also creates
obstacles to closing a business combination. The redemption
rights of SPAC stockholders and the short SPAC lifespan can
SPAC Solutions
Recently
completed
SPAC
business
combinations
demonstrate how SPACs can be successfully utilized in the
private equity dominated mergers-and-acquisitions (M&A)
market.
To compete with private equity bidders’ access to
cash, SPACs can enter into arrangements with third-party
investors or the SPAC’s sponsors to “backstop” a specified
amount of potential redemptions by public stockholders at the
same price per share as the redemption price per share.
These arrangements can guarantee cash certainty at closing
and provide validation of the SPAC’s valuation of the business
combination transaction, which in turn supports the trading
price of the SPAC’s shares. These arrangements encourage
targets to be more accepting of the timing and public
disclosure requirements and the redemption process of SPAC
bidders.
create deal un-certainty and timing obstacles, making targets
reluctant to sell to a SPAC. Targets often want at least some
cash consideration or for a specified amount of cash to remain
In addition, the attenuated timing to closing inherent in SPAC
transactions for sellers who are seeking cash can be
in the company for future growth—and always desire certainty
of closing—but the ability of the SPAC stockholders to redeem
addressed through these arrangements.
For example, the
recent $500 million acquisition of Del Taco Holdings, Inc. by
their shares can impact both. Even if SPAC business
combination agreements include a minimum cash condition to
protect a target from a closing if more redemptions than
Levy Acquisition Corp.
included a novel two-step structure. In
the first step, the SPAC’s sponsor and third-party investors
made an upfront cash investment of $120 million in the equity
expected occur, a SPAC generally cannot offer the deal
protection of a breakup fee due to its lack of access to the trust
account funds prior to closing a business combination.
of Del Taco by purchasing stock from Del Taco stockholders
and the company itself. The upfront investment provided
stockholders with immediate liquidity for a portion of their
Further, a large number of redemptions can put the post
business combination’s public company status at risk due to a
reduced market float that does not meet public company listing
requirements.
The time it takes to close a SPAC business
combination adds to these impediments, putting a SPAC at a
dis-advantage against private equity funds and strategic
buyers in a competitive bidding process. In a SPAC business
combination transaction, the parties must file disclosure
documents with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
holdings and allowed Del Taco to re-finance its
indebtedness—making its debt/equity ratio a more suitable
investment for public investors.
In addition, at the time of
entering into the agreement for the business combination
transaction, the SPAC arranged for a $35 million private
placement to take place at the closing of the business
combination to provide additional cash and additional deal
certainty.
Moreover, because the price paid in both the step-one cash
Commission (SEC), which include extensive information about
the transaction and the target, including audited financial
statements, pro forma financial information and other
investment and the closing private placement was based on
the proposed $500 million enterprise value for Del Taco in the
business combination transaction, it demonstrated to the
information that is typically disclosed in an IPO prospectus.
The process of preparing and resolving SEC comments on
these documents is time-consuming and expensive. Unless
market and SPAC stockholders that third-party investors and
the SPAC’s sponsor supported the proposed valuation of the
transaction. The additional cash investments also helped
these obstacles are addressed, some sellers may discount the
bid of a SPAC and not enter into a sale process with a SPAC.
support a SPAC common stock price at or in excess of the
redemption price that SPAC stockholders would receive if they
4
Inside M&A | October 2015
.
INSIDE M&A
redeemed their shares. The transaction was well-received by
the public markets, with the SPAC’s common stock trading up
to more than $5 above the per-share trust amount prior to the
closing of the business combination transaction, resulting in
nominal redemptions by public stockholders.
SPAC Directors Cannot Take the
Protection of the Business Judgment
Rule for Granted
Michael J. Dillon
In
Boulevard
Acquisition
Corp.’s
recent
acquisition
of
AgroFresh, a business of The Dow Chemical Company, more
than two-thirds of the purchase price was paid with cash
infused in the business combination in the form of a private
placement completed concurrently with the closing, increased
debt on the target and standby agreement under which the
seller and an affiliate of sponsor agreement to provide up to
$50 million in the event that the SPAC had insufficient cash to
pay the full cash consideration. Similar to the Del Taco
transaction, a significant portion of the cash infusion came
from parties to the business combination, an affiliate of the
sponsor and The Dow Chemical Company, which served as
an endorsement of the business combination valuation to the
market.
The AgroFresh transaction demonstrates how a
business combination with a SPAC can be an alternative to
the traditional spin-off transaction.
These recent SPAC transactions demonstrate that SPACs can
significantly increase deal certainty and their competitive
position in bidding processes by utilizing one or more of the
following:
ï‚§ An upfront cash investment to provide owners of the target
immediate cash liquidity and validation that the equity value
of the SPAC post-business combination is greater than the
redemption price (thus discouraging redemptions)
ï‚§ Re-financing the post-business combination company to
make it in line with debt/equity leverage ratios of public
companies of similarly situated businesses
ï‚§ Obtaining additional support by means of a capital infusion
or continued investment in the company by the sellers
and/or sponsor to show confidence in the valuation of the
business combination
The strategic decisions made by directors of Delaware
corporations are typically accorded the protection of the
business judgment rule, which “is a presumption that in
making a business decision, the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company.” (Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984)).
This
presumption may be rebutted if, among other things, it is
shown that the directors had a conflict of interest in making the
decision or breached their fiduciary duties, in which case the
burden shifts to the directors to defend the decision under the
entire fairness standard. A recent decision by the New York
State Supreme Court’s Commercial Division—in AP Services,
LLP v. Lobell, et al., No.
651613/12—suggests that certain
structural terms of special-purpose acquisition companies
(SPACs) may make it more challenging for the business
judgment rule to apply to decisions by SPAC directors to enter
into agreements for business combination transactions.
Background
In June 2005, principals of a bioscience venture capital firm
founded Paramount Acquisition Corp. (Paramount) as a
SPAC, purchasing 2,125,000 shares of Paramount’s common
stock (founder shares) for $0.01176 per share, or $25,000 in
the aggregate. These principals also served as members of
the board of directors of Paramount.
In October 2005,
Paramount conducted its initial public offering (IPO), selling
9,775,000 units, each consisting of one share of common
stock and two warrants, for a purchase price of $6 per unit,
raising approximately $53 million in net proceeds after offering
expenses. Approximately $52 million of the proceeds was
placed into a trust account for the benefit of Paramount’s
public stockholders. Following the IPO, pursuant to an
agreement with the underwriters of the IPO, Paramount’s
directors purchased approximately two million warrants in the
open market for an aggregate purchase price of approximately
$1.3 million.
Inside M&A | October 2015
5
.
INSIDE M&A
According to the IPO prospectus, Paramount’s purpose was to
entered into forbearance agreements with its lenders and,
effect a business combination transaction with an operating
business in the health care industry. However, under
according to the complaint in Lobell, the company admitted
that the historical audited financial statements on which the
Paramount’s certificate of incorporation, if a shareholderapproved acquisition of a health care entity failed to close by a
“drop-dead” date [either April 27, 2007 (18 months after
Business Combination Transaction was based were false. In
violation of its loan covenants, and un-able to work out its
debt, Chem Rx filed for bankruptcy in May 2010. The
Paramount’s IPO) or October 27, 2007 (24 months after
Paramount’s IPO) if Paramount had entered into a letter of
intent by April 27, 2007, but the transaction had not closed by
bankruptcy led to a distressed sale of Chem Rx and a Chapter
11 liquidation.
Following liquidation, the bankruptcy court
established a litigation trust to prosecute claims for Chem Rx’s
such date], Paramount would dissolve. In such an event, the
IPO proceeds held in the trust account would be distributed in
liquidation to Paramount’s public stockholders, and all of
un-secured creditors.
Paramount’s warrants (including those purchased by the
directors) would expire worthless. In connection with the IPO,
the directors waived their right to any liquidating distributions
from the trust account with respect to their founder shares.
In
addition, under the terms of Paramount’s certificate of
incorporation, public stockholders would have the right to
convert their public shares into a pro rata portion of the
proceeds held in the trust account in connection with a
business combination transaction if they voted against the
Lobell is the litigation trust’s (i.e., the Plaintiff’s) suit against
Paramount’s directors (the Directors), in which the Plaintiff
alleged, inter alia, that the Directors breached their fiduciary
duties of loyalty and care to Paramount by allowing Paramount
to enter into the Business Combination Transaction, because,
in approving the transaction, the Directors were self-interested
or controlled by an interested director and, in their rush to
approve the Business Combination Transaction, the Directors
transaction.
ignored key red flags that should have alerted them to the fact
that Chem Rx's audited financial statements were untrustworthy. The Directors moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s
On April 24, 2007, after having considered a number of
business combination candidates, and after a different
complaint, arguing, among other things, that their decision to
approve the Business Combination Transaction should be
protected by Delaware’s business judgment rule.
potential transaction fell through, Paramount entered into a
letter of intent for a business combination with Chem Rx, a
long-term-care pharmacy, as well as letters of intent for two
other potential business combinations, thereby extending the
drop-dead date to October. On October 22, 2007, five days
before the drop-dead date, Paramount acquired Chem Rx in a
leveraged acquisition in which it used the cash remaining in its
trust account after conversions plus approximately $160
million in debt financing and 2.5 million shares as the purchase
price (the Business Combination Transaction).
In connection
with the closing of the transaction, Paramount changed its
Justice Marcy Friedman ruled on the motion in a June 19,
2015, decision/order (the Lobell Order), dismissing certain
causes of action but denying the Directors’ motion with regard
to the fiduciary breach claim. Specifically, the court rejected
the Directors’ reliance on the business judgment rule in their
argument for dismissal, holding that the Plaintiff alleged
sufficient facts to plead a claim for breach of the duty of loyalty
or a claim for breach of the duty of due care. An appeal of the
Lobell Order filed by both parties remains pending in the First
Department.
name to Chem Rx Corporation.
Analysis
In April 2009, 18 months after the transaction closed, Chem
Rx publicly announced that it was un-able to file its annual
report for 2008, because it was in violation of certain financial
covenants under its two principal credit facilities and, because
of the un-certainty as to a resolution of the covenant violations,
the proper accounting for the credit facility indebtedness was
in doubt.
In May 2009, Chem Rx announced that it had
6
Inside M&A | October 2015
The court’s conclusion that the Plaintiff adequately pled a
breach of the duty of loyalty was based on the alleged selfinterest of the majority of the Directors arising from their
ownership of founder shares and warrants, which would have
no value if Paramount did not close the Business Combination
Transaction by the drop-dead date. This has implications for
. INSIDE M&A
many SPACs, because it is common for SPAC directors to
flags, and that their failure to investigate in response to the red
own similar founder shares or warrants.
flags amounts to “gross negligence” and “intentional dereliction
of their fiduciary duties.” The court acknowledged these
One of the arguments the Directors made in their defense was
allegations, and found that even where the SPAC’s certificate
of incorporation exculpates the directors from ordinary
negligence, a duty-of-care claim may be premised on gross
that the Directors did not have the power to cause the
acquisition to be made, because it was expressly subject to
the affirmative vote of a supermajority of dis-interested
stockholders. In its decision, the court acknowledged this
argument in a footnote, but stated that the Defendants did not
submit “legal authority addressing the impact on directors’
good faith decision-making of investor protections which may
be adopted in connection with SPACS, including a
requirement that a majority of IPO stockholders approve a
business combination” and that the court expected this
omission to be “addressed at a future stage of the litigation.”
Notably, there are numerous Delaware court decisions holding
that the legal effect of a fully informed stockholder vote of a
transaction is that the business judgment rule applies and
insulates the transaction from all attacks other than on the
grounds of waste, even if a majority of the board approving the
transaction was not dis-interested or independent. See In re
KKR Financial Holdings LLC Shareholder Litigation, C.A. No.
9210-CB (Del.
Ch. October 14, 2014).
Thus, this defense should ultimately prevail if the Defendants
can show that the disclosure included by Paramount in its
proxy statement for the stockholder vote was sufficient to fully
inform Paramount’s stockholders about the Business
Combination Transaction, as well as that it did not constitute
waste, which is a low bar to meet. In a related argument, the
Defendants asserted that the ability of each public stockholder
to choose to convert their shares into a pro rata portion of the
trust account also supported the notion that the board decision
had no operative effect and, therefore, that it could not
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.
Here, too, the Defendants
did not cite legal authority, which they may seek to do in a
future stage of the litigation. However, neither of these
arguments was dispositive of the motion before the court, as
the court’s focus was solely on the sufficiency of the pleading.
Thus, the court’s conclusion that the Plaintiff adequately pled a
breach of the duty of care puts a focus on the adequacy of the
due diligence that SPACs undertake in connection with their
business combination transactions. The Plaintiff claimed that
negligence in failing to heed red flags.
Key Takeaways
The Lobell Order highlights the need for SPAC directors to
make sure that management of the SPAC engages in
thorough due diligence of a business combination target, and
investigates any red flags before entering into a binding
agreement to fulfill their duty of care.
Directors also should
ensure that the disclosure document that the SPAC prepares
and circulates to its shareholders is comprehensive and
highlights not only the positive aspects of the target, but also
any negatives. Thus, the shareholders can make an informed
decision, and approve the transaction by a majority of disinterested shareholders (as a supermajority vote of public
stockholders no longer is required under SPAC charters in
order to approve a business combination). By taking these two
steps—even if the directors own founder shares or warrants—
their decisions may qualify for the protection of the business
judgment rule.
SPACs may also consider appointing one or
more directors who do not own any founder shares or
warrants—and are not otherwise affiliated with the principal
sponsor—to act as a special independent committee to
approve the transaction, thereby obviating the need to rely on
an informed decision by shareholders in order to qualify for
the protection of the business judgment rule.
McDERMOTT CORPORATE HIGHLIGHTS
McDermott Expands in Dallas’ Uptown District to
Accommodate Growing Practice
Our recently opened Dallas office has relocated to more
expansive space in the Uptown business district. Over the
past six months, the office has added almost two dozen
corporate, tax controversy, technology and outsourcing
lawyers.
the Directors "willfully ignored" and "closed their eyes" to red
Inside M&A | October 2015
7
. INSIDE M&A
EDITORS
For more information, please contact your regular McDermott
lawyer, or:
Jake Townsend
+1 312 984 3673
jtownsend@mwe.com
Joel L. Rubinstein
+1 212 547 5336
jrubinstein@mwe.com
For more information about McDermott Will & Emery visit
www.mwe.com
IRS Circular 230 Disclosure: To comply with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you that
any U.S. federal tax advice contained herein (including any attachments), unless specifically stated
otherwise, is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purposes of (i)
avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting, marketing or recommending
to another party any transaction or matter herein.
The material in this publication may not be reproduced, in whole or part without acknowledgement
of its source and copyright. Inside M&A is intended to provide information of general interest in a
summary manner and should not be construed as individual legal advice.
Readers should consult
with their McDermott Will & Emery lawyer or other professional counsel before acting on the
information contained in this publication.
©2015 McDermott Will & Emery. The following legal entities are collectively referred to as
“McDermott Will & Emery,” “McDermott” or “the Firm”: McDermott Will & Emery LLP, McDermott
Will & Emery AARPI, McDermott Will & Emery Belgium LLP, McDermott Will & Emery
Rechtsanwälte Steuerberater LLP, McDermott Will & Emery Studio Legale Associato and
McDermott Will & Emery UK LLP. These entities coordinate their activities through service
agreements.
McDermott has a strategic alliance with MWE China Law Offices, a separate law firm.
This communication may be considered attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee a
similar outcome.
8
Inside M&A | October 2015
. INSIDE M&A
Office Locations
BOSTON
BRUSSELS
CHICAGO
28 State Street
Boston, MA 02109
USA
Tel: +1 617 535 4000
Fax: +1 617 535 3800
Avenue des Nerviens 9-31
1040 Brussels
Belgium
Tel: +32 2 230 50 59
Fax: +32 2 230 57 13
227 West Monroe Street
Chicago, IL 60606
USA
Tel: +1 312 372 2000
Fax: +1 312 984 7700
DALLAS
DÜSSELDORF
FRANKFURT
2501 North Harwood Street, Suite 1900
Dallas, TX 75201
USA
Tel: +1 214 295 8000
Fax: +1 972 232 3098
Stadttor 1
40219 Düsseldorf
Germany
Tel: +49 211 30211 0
Fax: +49 211 30211 555
Feldbergstraße 35
60323 Frankfurt a. M.
Germany
Tel: +49 69 951145 0
Fax: + 49 69 271599 633
HOUSTON
LONDON
LOS ANGELES
1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 3900
Houston, TX 77002
USA
Tel: +1 713 653 1700
Fax: +1 713 739 7592
Heron Tower
110 Bishopsgate
London EC2N 4AY
United Kingdom
Tel: +44 20 7577 6900
Fax: +44 20 7577 6950
2049 Century Park East, 38th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
USA
Tel: +1 310 277 4110
Fax: +1 310 277 4730
MIAMI
MILAN
MUNICH
333 SE 2nd Avenue, Suite 4500
Miami, FL 33131
USA
Tel: +1 305 358 3500
Fax: +1 305 347 6500
Via dei Bossi, 4/6
20121 Milan
Italy
Tel: +39 02 78627300
Fax: +39 02 78627333
Nymphenburger Str. 3
80335 Munich
Germany
Tel: +49 89 12712 0
Fax: +49 89 12712 111
NEW YORK
ORANGE COUNTY
PARIS
340 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10173
USA
Tel: +1 212 547 5400
Fax: +1 212 547 5444
4 Park Plaza, Suite 1700
Irvine, CA 92614
USA
Tel: +1 949 851 0633
Fax: +1 949 851 9348
23 rue de l'Université
75007 Paris
France
Tel: +33 1 81 69 15 00
Fax: +33 1 81 69 15 15
ROME
SEOUL
SHANGHAI
Via A. Ristori, 38
00197 Rome
Italy
Tel: +39 06 462024 1
Fax: +39 06 489062 85
18F West Tower
Mirae Asset Center1
26, Eulji-ro 5-gil, Jung-gu
Seoul 04539
Korea
Tel: +82 2 6030 3600
Fax: +82 2 6322 9886
MWE China Law Offices
Strategic alliance with
McDermott Will & Emery
28th Floor Jin Mao Building
88 Century Boulevard
Shanghai Pudong New Area
P.R.China 200121
Tel: +86 21 6105 0500
Fax: +86 21 6105 0501
SILICON VALLEY
275 Middlefield Road, Suite 100
Menlo Park, CA 94025
USA
Tel: +1 650 815 7400
Fax: +1 650 815 7401
WASHINGTON, D.C.
The McDermott Building
500 North Capitol Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20001
USA
Tel: +1 202 756 8000
Fax: +1 202 756 8087
Inside M&A | October 2015
9
.