The Mergers &
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Acquisitions
Review
Appendix 1
THOMAS SACHER
Ashurst LLP
Thomas Sacher is a partner at Ashurst LLP since 1 July 2015. From 1986 through June
Ninth Edition
2015 Thomas Sacher was a member and, from 1992 through June 2015, partner of
another German law firm. He studied law at the universities of Munich and Regensburg
Editor
and received admission to the Bar in 1986. In 1990 he received a PhD (Dr jur) from the
University of Regensburg.
Mark Zerdin
Dr Sacher specialises in the areas of M&A, private equity and venture capital.
He
advises his national and international clients in a variety of corporate law matters related
to domestic and cross-border transactions and provides legal advice on transformations,
mergers, formation of joint ventures, stock option plans and other corporate transactions.
ASHURST LLP
Ludwigstraße 8
80539 Munich
Germany
Tel: +49 89 24 44 21 100
Fax: +49 89 24 44 21 101
thomas.sacher@ashurst.com
www.ashurst.com
Law Business Research
857
. The Mergers & Acquisitions Review
The Mergers & Acquisitions Review
Reproduced with permission from Law Business Research Ltd.
This article was first published in The Mergers & Acquisitions Review - Edition 9
(published in August 2015 – editor Mark Zerdin)
For further information please email
Nick.Barette@lbresearch.com
. The Mergers &
Acquisitions
Review
Ninth Edition
Editor
Mark Zerdin
Law Business Research Ltd
. PUBLISHER
Gideon Roberton
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGER
Nick Barette
SENIOR ACCOUNT MANAGERS
Katherine Jablonowska, Thomas Lee, Felicity Bown
ACCOUNT MANAGER
Joel Woods
PUBLISHING MANAGER
Lucy Brewer
MARKETING ASSISTANT
Rebecca Mogridge
EDITORIAL COORDINATOR
Shani Bans
HEAD OF PRODUCTION
Adam Myers
PRODUCTION EDITOR
Anna Andreoli
SUBEDITOR
Hilary Scott
MANAGING DIRECTOR
Richard Davey
Published in the United Kingdom
by Law Business Research Ltd, London
87 Lancaster Road, London, W11 1QQ, UK
© 2015 Law Business Research Ltd
www.TheLawReviews.co.uk
No photocopying: copyright licences do not apply.
The information provided in this publication is general and may not apply in a specific
situation, nor does it necessarily represent the views of authors’ firms or their clients.
Legal advice should always be sought before taking any legal action based on the
information provided. The publishers accept no responsibility for any acts or omissions
contained herein. Although the information provided is accurate as of August 2015, be
advised that this is a developing area.
Enquiries concerning reproduction should be sent to Law Business Research, at the
address above. Enquiries concerning editorial content should be directed
to the Publisher – gideon.roberton@lbresearch.com
ISBN 978-1-909830-62-2
Printed in Great Britain by
Encompass Print Solutions, Derbyshire
Tel: 0844 2480 112
.
THE LAW REVIEWS
THE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS REVIEW
THE RESTRUCTURING REVIEW
THE PRIVATE COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT REVIEW
THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REVIEW
THE EMPLOYMENT LAW REVIEW
THE PUBLIC COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT REVIEW
THE BANKING REGULATION REVIEW
THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION REVIEW
THE MERGER CONTROL REVIEW
THE TECHNOLOGY, MEDIA AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REVIEW
THE INWARD INVESTMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION REVIEW
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW
THE CORPORATE IMMIGRATION REVIEW
THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS REVIEW
THE PROJECTS AND CONSTRUCTION REVIEW
THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS REVIEW
THE REAL ESTATE LAW REVIEW
THE PRIVATE EQUITY REVIEW
THE ENERGY REGULATION AND MARKETS REVIEW
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW
THE ASSET MANAGEMENT REVIEW
. THE PRIVATE WEALTH AND PRIVATE CLIENT REVIEW
THE MINING LAW REVIEW
THE EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION REVIEW
THE ANTI-BRIBERY AND ANTI-CORRUPTION REVIEW
THE CARTELS AND LENIENCY REVIEW
THE TAX DISPUTES AND LITIGATION REVIEW
THE LIFE SCIENCES LAW REVIEW
THE INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE LAW REVIEW
THE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REVIEW
THE DOMINANCE AND MONOPOLIES REVIEW
THE AVIATION LAW REVIEW
THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGULATION REVIEW
THE ASSET TRACING AND RECOVERY REVIEW
THE INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY REVIEW
THE OIL AND GAS LAW REVIEW
THE FRANCHISE LAW REVIEW
THE PRODUCT REGULATION AND LIABILITY REVIEW
THE SHIPPING LAW REVIEW
THE ACQUISITION AND LEVERAGED FINANCE REVIEW
THE PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION AND CYBERSECURITY LAW REVIEW
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP LAW REVIEW
THE TRANSPORT FINANCE LAW REVIEW
THE SECURITIES LITIGATION REVIEW
THE LENDING AND SECURED FINANCE REVIEW
www.TheLawReviews.co.uk
. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The publisher acknowledges and thanks the following law firms for their learned
assistance throughout the preparation of this book:
AABØ-EVENSEN & CO ADVOKATFIRMA
Æ
´LEX
AGUILAR CASTILLO LOVE
AKD NV
ALLEN & GLEDHILL LLP
ANDERSON MÅŒRI & TOMOTSUNE
ARIAS, FÁBREGA & FÁBREGA
ASHURST LLP
AZMI & ASSOCIATES
BHARUCHA & PARTNERS
BOWMAN GILFILLAN
BREDIN PRAT
BRIGARD & URRUTIA
CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON
CORRS CHAMBERS WESTGARTH
COULSON HARNEY
CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP
i
. Acknowledgements
DELFINO E ASSOCIATI WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP
DITTMAR & INDRENIUS
DRYLLERAKIS & ASSOCIATES
ELLEX
FENXUN PARTNERS
HARNEYS
HENGELER MUELLER
HEUKING KÜHN LÜER WOJTEK
ISOLAS
KBH KAANUUN
KEMPHOOGSTAD, S.R.O.
KIM & CHANG
KINSTELLAR, S.R.O., ADVOKÁTNÍ KANCELÁŘ
KLART SZABÓ LEGAL LAW FIRM
LEGAL ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS
LETT LAW FIRM P/S
MAKES & PARTNERS LAW FIRM
MATTOS FILHO, VEIGA FILHO, MARREY JR E QUIROGA ADVOGADOS
MNKS
MORAVČEVIĆ VOJNOVIĆ I PARTNERI IN COOPERATION WITH
SCHÖNHERR
MOTIEKA & AUDZEVIÄŒIUS
NISHIMURA & ASAHI
OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT LLP
ii
. Acknowledgements
PÉREZ BUSTAMANTE & PONCE
POPOVICI NIÈšU & ASOCIAÈšII
ROJS, PELJHAN, PRELESNIK & PARTNERS
RUBIO LEGUÍA NORMAND
RUSSIN, VECCHI & HEREDIA BONETTI
S HOROWITZ & CO
SCHELLENBERG WITTMER LTD
SCHINDLER RECHTSANWÄLTE GMBH
SELVAM & PARTNERS
SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
SLAUGHTER AND MAY
STRELIA
SYCIP SALAZAR HERNANDEZ & GATMAITAN
TORRES, PLAZ & ARAUJO
URÍA MENÉNDEZ
UTEEM CHAMBERS
VON WOBESER Y SIERRA, SC
WEERAWONG, CHINNAVAT & PEANGPANOR LTD
WH PARTNERS
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
iii
. CONTENTS
Editor’s Preface
�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������xiii
Mark Zerdin
Chapter 1
EU OVERVIEW�������������������������������������������������������������������������1
Mark Zerdin
Chapter 2
EU COMPETITION OVERVIEW������������������������������������������11
Götz Drauz and Michael Rosenthal
Chapter 3
EUROPEAN PRIVATE EQUITY���������������������������������������������19
Thomas Sacher
Chapter 4
US ANTITRUST����������������������������������������������������������������������32
Scott A Sher, Christopher A Williams and Bradley T Tennis
Chapter 5
CROSS-BORDER EMPLOYMENT ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL M&A�������������������������������������������������������53
Marjorie Culver, Darren Gardner, Ming Henderson,
Dominic Hodson and Peter Talibart
Chapter 6
M&A LITIGATION�����������������������������������������������������������������67
Mitchell A Lowenthal, Roger A Cooper and Matthew Gurgel
Chapter 7
AUSTRALIA�����������������������������������������������������������������������������74
Braddon Jolley, Sandy Mak and Jaclyn Riley-Smith
Chapter 8
AUSTRIA����������������������������������������������������������������������������������87
Clemens Philipp Schindler
Chapter 9
BAHRAIN��������������������������������������������������������������������������������97
Haifa Khunji and Natalia Kumar
v
. Contents
Chapter 10
BELGIUM������������������������������������������������������������������������������110
Olivier Clevenbergh, Gisèle Rosselle and Carl-Philip de Villegas
Chapter 11
BRAZIL����������������������������������������������������������������������������������122
Moacir Zilbovicius and Rodrigo Ferreira Figueiredo
Chapter 12
BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS������������������������������������������������132
Jacqueline Daley-Aspinall and Sarah Lou Rockhead
Chapter 13
CANADA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������143
Robert Yalden, Emmanuel Pressman and Jeremy Fraiberg
Chapter 14
CAYMAN ISLANDS��������������������������������������������������������������158
Marco Martins
Chapter 15
CHINA�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������173
Lu Yurui and Ling Qian
Chapter 16
COLOMBIA���������������������������������������������������������������������������187
Sergio Michelsen Jaramillo
Chapter 17
COSTA RICA�������������������������������������������������������������������������203
John Aguilar Jr and Alvaro Quesada
Chapter 18
CYPRUS���������������������������������������������������������������������������������211
Nancy Ch Erotocritou
Chapter 19
CZECH REPUBLIC���������������������������������������������������������������218
Lukáš ŠevÄík, Jitka Logesová and Bohdana Pražská
Chapter 20
DENMARK����������������������������������������������������������������������������225
Sebastian Ingversen and Nicholas Lerche-Gredal
Chapter 21
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC����������������������������������������������������236
María Esther Fernández A de Pou, Mónica Villafaña Aquino
and Laura Fernández-Peix Perez
vi
. Contents
Chapter 22
ECUADOR�����������������������������������������������������������������������������246
Diego Pérez-Ordóñez
Chapter 23
ESTONIA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������257
Sven Papp and Sven Böttcher
Chapter 24
FINLAND������������������������������������������������������������������������������269
Jan Ollila, Wilhelm Eklund and Jasper Kuhlefelt
Chapter 25
FRANCE���������������������������������������������������������������������������������281
Didier Martin and Hubert Zhang
Chapter 26
GERMANY�����������������������������������������������������������������������������296
Heinrich Knepper
Chapter 27
GIBRALTAR���������������������������������������������������������������������������309
Steven Caetano
Chapter 28
GREECE���������������������������������������������������������������������������������321
Cleomenis G Yannikas, Sophia K Grigoriadou and Vassilis S
Constantinidis
Chapter 29
HONG KONG�����������������������������������������������������������������������334
Jason Webber
Chapter 30
HUNGARY�����������������������������������������������������������������������������344
Levente Szabó and Klaudia Ruppl
Chapter 31
ICELAND�������������������������������������������������������������������������������360
Hans Henning Hoff
Chapter 32
INDIA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������368
Justin Bharucha
Chapter 33
INDONESIA��������������������������������������������������������������������������386
Yozua Makes
vii
. Contents
Chapter 34
ISRAEL�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������400
Clifford Davis and Keith Shaw
Chapter 35
ITALY��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������410
Maurizio Delfino
Chapter 36
JAPAN�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������422
Hiroki Kodate and Masami Murano
Chapter 37
KENYA�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������431
Joyce Karanja-Ng’ang’a, Wathingira Muthang’ato and Felicia
Solomon Nyale
Chapter 38
KOREA�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������442
Jong Koo Park, Bo Yong Ahn, Sung Uk Park and Young Min Lee
Chapter 39
LITHUANIA��������������������������������������������������������������������������457
Giedrius Kolesnikovas and Michail ParchimoviÄ
Chapter 40
LUXEMBOURG��������������������������������������������������������������������465
Marie-Béatrice Noble, Raquel Guevara, Stéphanie Antoine
Chapter 41
MALAYSIA�����������������������������������������������������������������������������479
Rosinah Mohd Salleh and Norhisham Abd Bahrin
Chapter 42
MALTA�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������491
James Scicluna
Chapter 43
MAURITIUS��������������������������������������������������������������������������503
Muhammad Reza Cassam Uteem and Basheema Farreedun
Chapter 44
MEXICO��������������������������������������������������������������������������������513
Luis Burgueño and Andrés Nieto
Chapter 45
MONTENEGRO�������������������������������������������������������������������523
Slaven MoravÄević and Dijana Grujić
viii
. Contents
Chapter 46
MYANMAR����������������������������������������������������������������������������533
Krishna Ramachandra and Benjamin Kheng
Chapter 47
NETHERLANDS�������������������������������������������������������������������544
Carlos Pita Cao and François Koppenol
Chapter 48
NIGERIA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������557
Lawrence Fubara Anga
Chapter 49
NORWAY�������������������������������������������������������������������������������562
Ole K Aabø-Evensen
Chapter 50
PANAMA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������600
Andrés N Rubinoff
Chapter 51
PERU��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������611
Emil Ruppert
Chapter 52
PHILIPPINES�������������������������������������������������������������������������621
Rafael A Morales, Philbert E Varona, Hiyasmin H Lapitan
and Patricia A Madarang
Chapter 53
PORTUGAL���������������������������������������������������������������������������630
Francisco Brito e Abreu and Joana Torres Ereio
Chapter 54
ROMANIA�����������������������������������������������������������������������������643
Andreea Hulub, Ana-Maria Mihai and Vlad Ambrozie
Chapter 55
RUSSIA�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������657
Scott Senecal, Yulia Solomakhina, Polina Tulupova,
Yury Babichev and Alexander Mandzhiev
Chapter 56
SERBIA�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������675
Matija Vojnović and Luka LopiÄić
Chapter 57
SINGAPORE��������������������������������������������������������������������������685
Lim Mei and Lee Kee Yeng
ix
. Contents
Chapter 58
SLOVENIA�����������������������������������������������������������������������������694
David PremelÄ, Bojan Šporar and Mateja ŠÄuka
Chapter 59
SOUTH AFRICA�������������������������������������������������������������������705
Ezra Davids and Ashleigh Hale
Chapter 60
SPAIN�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������716
Christian Hoedl and Javier Ruiz-Cámara
Chapter 61
SWITZERLAND��������������������������������������������������������������������732
Lorenzo Olgiati, Martin Weber, Jean Jacques Ah Choon,
Harun Can and David Mamane
Chapter 62
THAILAND���������������������������������������������������������������������������745
Pakdee Paknara and Pattraporn Poovasathien
Chapter 63
TURKEY���������������������������������������������������������������������������������753
Emre Akın Sait
Chapter 64
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES�������������������������������������������������762
DK Singh and Stincy Mary Joseph
Chapter 65
UNITED KINGDOM�����������������������������������������������������������774
Mark Zerdin
Chapter 66
UNITED STATES������������������������������������������������������������������793
Richard Hall and Mark Greene
Chapter 67
VENEZUELA�������������������������������������������������������������������������834
Guillermo de la Rosa, Juan D Alfonzo, Nelson Borjas E,
Pedro Durán A and Maritza Quintero M
Chapter 68
VIETNAM������������������������������������������������������������������������������847
Hikaru Oguchi, Taro Hirosawa, Ha Hoang Loc
x
. Contents
Appendix 1
ABOUT THE AUTHORS�����������������������������������������������������857
Appendix 2
CONTRIBUTING LAW FIRMS’ CONTACT DETAILS�����905
xi
. EDITOR’S PREFACE
By a number of measures, it could be argued that it has been some time since the outlook
for the M&A market looked healthier. The past year has seen a boom in deal making,
with many markets seeing post-crisis peaks and some recording all-time highs. Looking
behind the headline figures, however, a number of factors suggest deal making may not
continue to grow as rapidly as it has done recently.
One key driver affecting global figures is the widely expected rise of US interest
rates. Cheap debt has played a significant part in the surge of US deal making in the first
few months of 2015, and the prospects of a rate rise may have some dampening effects.
However, the most recent indications from the Federal Reserve have suggested that any
rise will be gradual and some market participants have pushed back predictions for the
first rate rise to December 2015.
Meanwhile, eurozone and UK interest rates look likely
to remain low for some time further.
The eurozone returned to the headlines in June as the prospect of a Greek exit
looked increasingly real. Even assuming Greece remains in the euro (as now seems
likely), the crisis has severely damaged the relationship between Greece and its creditors.
The brinksmanship exhibited by all parties means that meaningful progress cannot occur
except at the conclusion of a crisis: the idea that reform will benefit Greece has been lost
and each measure extracted by creditors is couched as a concession. However, while the
political debate has become ever more fractious, the market’s response to the crisis has
been relatively sanguine.
This is largely a result of the fact that the volume of Greek debt
is no longer in the market, but in the hands of institutions. But it is also a sign of the
general market recovery and expectations that major economies will continue to grow.
Perhaps one of the more interesting emerging trends in the last year is the interplay
between growth and productivity. Some commentators have suggested that the recent
rise in deal making is a symptom of a climate in which businesses remain reluctant to
invest in capital and productivity.
Pessimistic about the opportunities for organic growth,
companies instead seek to grow profits through cost savings on mergers. It is difficult to
generalise about such matters: inevitably, deal drivers will vary from industry to industry,
from market to market. However, if synergies have been the principal motivation in
xiii
.
Editor’s Preface
much of the year’s deal making (it certainly has been in a number of large-cap deals) then
it may be that the market is a little farther from sustainable growth than some would
like to think.
I would like to thank the contributors for their support in producing the ninth
edition of The Mergers & Acquisitions Review. I hope that the commentary in the following
chapters will provide a richer understanding of the shape of the global markets, together
with the challenges and opportunities facing market participants.
Mark Zerdin
Slaughter and May
London
August 2015
xiv
. Chapter 55
RUSSIA
Scott Senecal, Yulia Solomakhina, Polina Tulupova,
Yury Babichev and Alexander Mandzhiev1
I
OVERVIEW OF M&A ACTIVITY
Since 2012, overall M&A activity involving Russian businesses has declined in terms of
the number of completed significant deals.2 In terms of deal value, although 2013 was a
record year with approximately US$110 billion of completed deals because of the largest
takeover in Russian history – the US$55 billion acquisitions of TNK-BP by Rosneft –
overall Russian M&A activity was stagnant. In 2014, Russian M&A slightly exceeded
US$30 billion, roughly a quarter of the 2013 value level (or half excluding the Rosneft/
TNK-BP transactions). In 2014, as in the previous years, Russian M&A transactions
were principally driven by domestic buyers and in particular by state-affiliated buyers. In
total, in 2014, domestic M&A accounted for around 57 per cent of all Russian M&A
(by value).3
1
2
3
Scott Senecal and Yulia Solomakhina are partners and Polina Tulupova, Yury Babichev and
Alexander Mandzhiev are associates at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLC.
They are
resident in the firm’s Moscow office.
Source: Thomson Reuters. In this article, Russian M&A activity refers to acquisitions of
businesses in Russia by domestic investors, irrespective of the place of incorporation of their
holding structures (domestic M&A), and by foreign investors (inbound M&A), as well
as acquisitions by Russian investors of businesses abroad (outbound M&A). All data and
references to legislation are as of 15 June 2015.
Source: Thomson Reuters.
657
.
Russia
II
GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
FOR M&A
The Civil Code of the Russian Federation,4 federal laws on particular forms of legal
entities (such as joint-stock companies5 or limited liability companies) and the Securities
Market Law6 constitute the fundamental framework of the federal legislation governing
the legal status of Russian companies and their securities, as well as relations between a
company and its shareholders and among shareholders. This framework is hierarchically
subject to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which by its own terms has direct
effect in Russian law, and to ratified international treaties of the Russian Federation.
This framework is further complemented by:
a
legislation setting forth restrictions on the economic concentration affecting the
Russian markets generally (competition law) and on various forms of control over
assets in particular industries, including banking, insurance and the media, as well
as industries deemed ‘strategic’ in Russia;7
b
procedural and enforcement legislation relevant, for example, in the context of
shareholder remedies and the resolution of corporate disputes; and
c
subordinate normative acts of various federal authorities of the Russian Federation,
including decrees of the President and regulations of the government and the
CBR,8 which implement federal legislation.
Although Russia is commonly referred to as a ‘civil law’ country, implying that its legal
system does not rely on judicial precedent, in fact, court practice can have normative
effect and is often of persuasive authority, especially rulings by higher courts.
The legal framework for M&A activities in Russia has been recently subject
to major reforms, both in institutional and substantive respects, and reforms are still
ongoing. Currently, there are four central developments:
a
the ‘de-offshorisation’ reform (which is still being implemented), principally
concerning Russian taxation regulations which are having a substantial effect on
the structuring of asset holdings and M&A transactions for domestic buyers, both
inbound and outbound;9
b
the reform of the Civil Code;10
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Civil Code of the Russian Federation, Part I (Federal Law No. 51-FZ of 30 November 1994),
Part II (Federal Law No.
14-FZ of 26 January 1996), Part III (Federal Law No. 146-FZ of
26 November 2001), Part IV (Federal law No. 230-FZ of 18 December 2006), in each case,
as amended (the Civil Code).
Federal Law No.
208-FZ on Joint-Stock Companies of 26 December 1995, as amended (the
Joint-Stock Company Law).
Federal Law No. 39-FZ on the Securities Market of 22 April 1996, as amended (the Securities
Market Law).
See Sections IV and IX, infra.
The Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBR).
See Section VIII, infra.
See Section III, infra.
658
. Russia
c
d
the merger of the Supreme Commercial Court of the Russian Federation (SCC),
which served as the top judicial body for the resolution of economic disputes, and
the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, with effect from 6 August 2014;
and
the creation of the financial mega-regulator in Russia completed in 2013 when
the Federal Service for Financial Markets became part of the CBR, which has
combined regulatory and supervision powers to better manage systemic risks and
stability of domestic financial markets in response to the 2008–2009 crisis.
In regard to item (c) above, prior to the merger with the Supreme Court, the SCC had
been quite active and authoritative in issuing interpretative guidance on business law
matters. Two types of its decisions – a resolution of the Plenum of the SCC (usually
summarising court practice related to a particular issue or area of law) and a resolution
of the Presidium of the SCC in an individual case declared to have ‘precedential value’
– were effectively binding in other cases considered by commercial courts. The earlier
binding practice of the SCC should continue to have effect for lower commercial courts
until repealed or changed by the Supreme Court. However, it is still uncertain whether
the Supreme Court will be as inclined to and adept in resolving business legal issues as
the SCC had been.
In terms of the form of M&A deals in Russia, privately negotiated deals, including
auction sales, are prevalent, as Russian businesses tend to have one or several controlling
or significant shareholders.
Even in the context of acquiring companies publicly traded
in Russia, non-solicited or voluntary public tender offers are rare.
At the same time, any acquisition of equities in a Russian public joint-stock
company is subject to the Russian takeover regulations, should the acquisition exceed
certain thresholds. Generally, a person who, alone or together with its affiliates, has
acquired more than 30 per cent of the total number of ordinary and certain other voting
shares (if any) of a public joint-stock company must submit a mandatory bid for the
remaining shares of such classes.11 The CBR supervises compliance with the takeover
regulations, including in the form of an advance review of any mandatory bid for publicly
traded shares. Furthermore, Russian takeover regulations provide for a possibility of
squeezing out minority shareholders once an acquiror’s stake exceeds 95 per cent of
ordinary and certain other voting shares (if any) of a public joint-stock company, subject
to rules as to how the 95 per cent threshold is accomplished, the timing of a squeeze-out
and its price.
11
Russian takeover regulations are concentrated in Chapter XI.1 of the Joint-Stock Company
Law, as well as implementing acts of the CBR and its predecessor.
Prior to the 2014 Civil
Code amendments, the mandatory bid rule applied to any equity acquisition above a certain
threshold in an open joint-stock company, irrespective of whether its shares were publicly
traded or not. Although the corporate form of an open joint-stock company has ceased
to exist, the mandatory bid rule continues to apply in certain cases to open joint-stock
companies that have not been transformed into a current corporate form, as well as to public
joint-stock companies.
659
. Russia
Finally, corporate shareholdings of Russian businesses have been commonly
arranged as multiple-layer structures, where an offshore company (for example, Cypriot
or Dutch) holds Russian operational entities (first layer), while investors participate in
that offshore holding company (second layer) or even at ‘higher’ layers of the holding
structure. These structures historically emerged for a combination of reasons, including
a possibility to benefit from (believed to be) flexible foreign law and legal institutions to
govern relations between investors. Although Russian-law documentation is increasingly
used for M&A transactions, foreign law, especially English law, still tends to govern
significant M&A deals in Russia.12 It would not be surprising if greater ‘Russification’
of M&A occurs, spurred by the ‘de-offshorisation’ reform and related changes in tax,
corporate and civil law.
III
DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE AND TAKEOVER LAW AND
THEIR IMPACT
i
2012–2015 amendments to the Civil Code
The reform of the Civil Code in 2012–2015 stems from the 2008 initiative to revise the
Civil Code, 15 years after it was originally adopted. The reform has been implemented
by the ‘packages’ of amendments, the earliest in December 201213 and the latest in
March 2015,14 including a package comprising the corporate law reform.15
In terms of their scope, the 2012–2015 amendments to the Civil Code
substantially affect the civil law regime of business activities with respect to Russian
assets and entities.16 The amendments touch upon core areas of Russian business law,
such as: permissible corporate forms for commercial legal entities; corporate structure
and governance; the validity of transactions and challenges thereto; the validity of
corporate decisions; statutes of limitations; rules of agency and powers of attorney; and
the basic concept of an ‘obligation’ that underlies any business relationship.
We discuss
below some of the major changes from 2014 relevant in the Russian M&A context.17 As
12
13
14
15
16
17
D Afanasiev, ‘Competition of Jurisdiction: 10% Sovereignty’, Vedomosti No. 117 (3131) of
27 June 2012 (in Russian).
Federal Law No. 302-FZ ‘On Amendments to Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Part I of the Civil
Code of the Russian Federation’ of 30 December 2012.
Federal Law No.
42-FZ ‘On Amendments to Part I of the Civil Code of the Russian
Federation’ of 8 March 2015.
Federal Law No. 99-FZ ‘On Amendments to Chapter 4 of Part I of the Civil Code of the
Russian Federation […]’ of 5 May 2014 (the Corporate Law Amendments), generally
effective from 1 September 2014.
The amendments to the Civil Code adopted as part of the reform described here gradually
entered into force over 2013 and 2014, with some some changes becoming effective on
1 June 2015.
Changes in core civil law institutions relevant for M&A, such as validity of transactions,
statutes of limitations, agency and taking security (pledges), were discussed in the ‘Russia’
chapter of the previous edition hereof.
660
. Russia
with any similar overhaul of core business law regulations, the practical effects of these
amendments will be better understood as courts apply their provisions in litigations.
Reform of Russian corporate norms
General rules on corporate forms
The Corporate Law Amendments have codified an earlier doctrinal division of business
organisations into two main categories, corporate organisations and ‘unitary’ entities.
Corporations may be established in the form of joint-stock companies or limited
liability companies, the most widely used types of business organisations, or other forms
provided for by law. Unitary entities, an idiosyncratic form of non-corporate state-owned
commercial enterprises, continue to be used in the non-privatised sectors of the Russian
economy and represent a legacy of the Soviet legal system.
Public and non-public companies
As their most significant development, the Corporate Law Amendments distinguish
public from non-public companies and establish two distinct regimes of corporate
governance for each (superseding the prior distinction of ‘open joint-stock companies’
from ‘closed joint-stock companies’). Under the Corporate Law Amendments, a
joint-stock company can obtain the status of a public company if (i) its equity instruments
have been publicly offered or are publicly traded or (ii) it has (regardless of its number
of shareholders) voluntarily opted for the public company regime by stating such in its
charter. All other joint-stock companies and all limited liability companies are deemed
non-public.18 Amendments to the Joint-Stock Company Law modified the process by
which a joint-stock company obtains the status of a public company.
Such status is
generally effective once it is disclosed on the public register of legal entities.
Non-public companies enjoy greater flexibility in structuring their corporate
governance and regulation of internal procedures. In particular, non-public companies
have certain discretion to redistribute default statutory powers between the general
meeting of shareholders and management bodies, as well as to settle their internal
corporate structure. In addition, shareholders of a non-public company may agree to
disproportionate distribution of their voting and other rights, provided that the respective
rules are set forth in the charter or corporate agreements and disclosed in the public
register of legal entities.
Conversely, public companies must comply with mandatory
rules of corporate governance.
Expulsion of a shareholder
The Corporate Law Amendments provide that a shareholder of a non-public company
that has caused ‘material harm to the company’ or otherwise has ‘significantly complicated
its business operations’ (including by violating her or his corporate duties by consistently
failing to appear at general meetings voting on a CEO candidacy where his or her presence
18
After this chapter was submitted, further amendments to the Joint-Stock Company Law
modified the process by which a joint-stock company obtains the status of a public company.
Such status is generally effective once it is disclosed in the public register of legal entities.
661
. Russia
was needed for the decision to be adopted or unreasonably pursuing a corporate conflict)
may be squeezed out from the company for a fair value consideration upon a court ruling
solicited by another shareholder. The concepts of ‘material harm to the company’ or
causing ‘significant complications to business operations’ are not defined in the law, but
similar concepts have already applied to limited liability companies where courts have
construed them to encompass the above shareholder behaviour. In 2014, the Supreme
Court warned lower courts as to the exceptional nature of the expulsion remedy in the
context of a limited liability company with two 50 per cent shareholders, stating that it
should not be a court-administered solution to a deadlock where neither shareholder has
breached its corporate duties.19
Restoration of corporate rights
The Corporate Law Amendments introduce a remedy of restoration of corporate rights
which is different from the classic action of vindication (replevin) earlier applied by
Russian courts to restoration of illegally deprived share ownership. Under the new rules,
a shareholder may reclaim shares that he or she has been illegally deprived of from any
third party owning such shares (without regard as to whether the latter acquired the
shares in good faith) so long as it pays the third party fair market consideration for such
shares as set by court, possibly together with a recovery of such shareholder’s losses from
those responsible for the original loss of the shares.
However, the court has discretion to
deny this claim if the third-party owner would be ‘unfairly’ deprived of its shareholding
rights, or if such reclamation would cause ‘grossly negative social consequences’ or other
negative effects significant for the public interest. In the latter case, the claimant would
be entitled to a fair market consideration for the deprived ownership payable by the
person who originally caused the loss of the shares. This new remedy has not yet been
tested.
‘Two-key’ principle
The Corporate Law Amendments provide for the ‘two-key’ principle, previously unknown
in Russia, under which functions of the chief executive officer may be exercised by several
persons acting jointly or severally.
A company applying this dual management structure
must make an appropriate disclosure in the public register of legal entities. Several major
Russian public companies have already implemented the senior executive structure based
on the ‘two-key’ principle.
Corporate agreements
The amendments to the Civil Code now also provide for a general concept of ‘corporate
agreements’, confirming and expanding upon rules regulating shareholder agreements
that were introduced in Russian statutory law in 2009.20 In addition to a company’s
19
20
Determination of the Supreme Court No. 306-ES14-14 of 8 October 2014.
Article 32.1 of the Joint-Stock Company Law, as amended by Federal Law No.
119-FZ
of 3 June 2009; a similar provision exists in respect of limited liability companies since
1 July 2009.
662
. Russia
shareholders, parties to a corporate agreement may now include creditors or other third
parties aiming to protect their legitimate interests (but the company itself cannot be a
party). The company must be notified of the execution of a corporate agreement, while
disclosure of its contents is generally discretionary. If a corporate agreement is entered
into with regard to a public company, the company must disclose such, but the scope
of such disclosure is yet to be defined by law. Corporate agreements may provide for
special voting arrangements, as well as restrictions on selling shares (which may include
put/calls), but cannot oblige shareholders to vote in accordance with instructions of the
company’s own management bodies.
According to the Corporate Law Amendments, a corporate decision may be
declared void if it violates a corporate agreement to which all company’s shareholders
are parties.
Furthermore, a shareholder participating in such corporate agreement may
demand that a company’s transaction in breach of a corporate agreement be voided if
the other party to such transaction knew or should have known about the conflicting
provisions of the corporate agreement.
Liability of officers and directors in Russia
The starting point for directors’ and officers’ liability under Russian law is a long-standing
basic statutory rule that a corporate officer or director must act in the interests of the
company reasonably and in good faith, and in case of a breach of any of such duties
must compensate for the damages caused, upon a claim of the company itself or, in
certain cases, of a company’s shareholder. Until quite recently, high-level court practice
on holding officers or directors financially liable to their companies was relatively scarce.
Nor were the legislative provisions (outside of the bankruptcy context) any more detailed.
In its 2013 guidance to lower courts, the SCC formulated a Russian analogue
of the ‘business judgement rule’ and its limits.21 Recognising normal entrepreneurial
risk, the SCC stated that the mere fact of a company’s losses is not in itself evidence of
managerial bad faith or unreasonableness, and that the courts should not second-guess
the commercial sense of managerial decisions. The SCC also stated that, as a rule, the
burden of proving bad faith and losses falls on the claimant (while the respondent officer
or director should provide explanations as to the cause of losses).
Notably, the burden can
shift to the officer or director to prove that he or she acted in good faith and reasonably,
for example, where he or she does not cooperate in providing good faith explanations to
the court.
Effectively building on the SCC practice, the Corporate Law Amendments
provide that an officer or a director shall be liable for a failure to act in good faith or
reasonably, including if his or her actions (inactions) were inconsistent with common
business practices or normal entrepreneurial risk. The Corporate Law Amendments also
extend the standard of good faith and reasonable behaviour, as well as the liability regime,
to persons who have de facto ability to determine activities of a legal entity.22 This change
21
22
Resolution of the Plenum of the SCC No. 62 ‘On Certain Questions of Compensating
Damages by Members of the Governance Bodies of a Legal Entity’ of 30 July 2013.
Article 53.1 of the Civil Code (in effect from 1 September 2014).
663
.
Russia
has been viewed as a tool for piercing the corporate veil in appropriate circumstances,
although to date there are no reported court cases which have applied it as such.
Further, in its 2013 guidance, the SCC formulated a list of presumptions of
managerial bad faith and unreasonableness, where the burden to prove the opposite
shifts to the manager. The SCC explicitly stated that an act effectively in the interests of
one or several shareholders, but to the detriment of the company, is not an act in the best
interests of the company.
The SCC’s resolution incorporates further guidance for officers and directors on
the importance of proper procedure in decision-making and creating an adequate system
of controls. In this regard, the SCC noted that officers and directors may be liable for
damages caused as a result of a failure to establish an appropriate governance system
within their company. According to the SCC, this can be assessed by the court, for
example, taking into consideration the scale of the company’s business, usual commercial
practices and the officer’s or director’s personal involvement in his or her duties and their
performance.
In 2014, in a ruling against a CEO for inappropriate delegation of the
CEO’s powers, the SCC re-emphasised the importance of senior officers’ immediate and
personal involvement in the management of a company, supervision of subordinates and
maintaining the governance structure appropriate for the scale of the business.23
IV
FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN M&A TRANSACTIONS
i
2014 overview
In 2014, inbound deals where foreign investors acquired Russian assets accounted for
almost 30 per cent of Russian M&A activity by value.24 Some of this is likely Russian
money ‘round-tripped’ via offshore structures and reinvested in Russia. Cash investments
in the range of US$1 billion in total were made from each of China and the Netherlands.25
In 2014, Russian acquisitions abroad comprised around 15 per cent of overall
Russian M&A activity, with value of US$4.3 billion; top destinations for Russian
investments abroad included the EEA (particularly Italy), Kazakhstan and Venezuela.26
ii
Legal regime for foreign investments in Russia
Russian law generally promotes foreign investments in the Russian economy, but also
imposes certain limitations and restrictions on such investments. Russia is a party to
over 70 bilateral and multilateral treaties (over 50 of which are currently in force)27 that
guarantee fair and equitable treatment, national and most-favoured nation treatment,
repatriation of investments and profits, and protection against expropriation without
23
24
25
26
27
Resolution of the SCC No.
9324/13 of 21 January 2014. In this case, damages in the amount
of 100 million roubles were awarded against personally the CEO for a failure to act in good
faith and reasonably.
Source: Thomson Reuters. Investments with a disclosed amount exceeding US$50 million.
Source: Thomson Reuters.
Source: Thomson Reuters.
Investments with a disclosed amount exceeding US$50 million.
Source: http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_russia.pdf.
664
. Russia
adequate compensation.28 These and other guarantees are further provided in the Foreign
Investments Law.29 Moreover, Russian authorities aim to extend the network of such
investment protection treaties in order to provide for reciprocal protection for Russian
businesses investing abroad.30
In 2008, Russia enacted the Foreign Strategic Investments Law31 that established
a special clearance procedure (outlined below) for foreign investments into companies
engaged in, currently, 45 strategic activities, which can be grouped into the following
categories: (1) geological survey and exploration and production of subsoil of federal
significance; (2) weaponry, cryptography, eavesdropping devices and other similar
devices; (3) nuclear production and radiation safety; (4) aerospace and aviation;
(5) ‘natural monopolies’, including pipelines to transport gas, oil and petroleum
products, power stations, railways, airports and seaports; (6) companies dominant
(under the Competition Law)32 in a particular market; (7) the fishing industry; (8)
television and radio broadcasters dominant in a particular region of Russia, certain large
telecommunication providers (excluding the internet), large printing and publishing
companies; (9) activities that ‘actively influence’ hydro-meteorological and geological
processes; (10) pathogens of infectious diseases; and (11) transportation security. In
November 2014, food production involving use of pathogens of infectious diseases was
removed from the scope of strategic activities,33 with the practical result that foreign
investments in industries such as brewing and dairy would not be subject to the FSIL
review.
28
29
30
31
32
33
Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 456 ‘On the Conclusion of
Agreements Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Governments of
Foreign States on Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments’ of 9 June 2001, as
amended.
Federal Law No. 160-FZ ‘On Foreign Investments in the Russian Federation’ of 9 July 1999,
as amended (the FIL).
Order of the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation No.
195
‘On Approval of the Plan of the Negotiations on the Conclusion of Inter-Governmental
Agreements on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments in 2015’ of
1 April 2015 available at http://merit.consultant.ru/page.aspx?74752 (in Russian).
Federal Law No. 57-FZ ‘On the Order of Accomplishing Foreign Investment In Entities
Having Strategic Importance for Procuring State Defence and Security’ of 29 April 2008, as
amended (the FSIL).
Federal Law No. 135-FZ ‘On Protection of Competition’ of 26 July 2006, as amended (the
Competition Law).
Federal Law No.343-FZ ‘On Amendments to the Federal Law ‘On the Order of
Accomplishing Foreign Investment In Entities Having Strategic Importance for Procuring
State Defense and Security’ and Certain Other Legislative Acts of the Russian Feederation’ of
4 November 2014 (the 2014 FSIL Amendments).
665
.
Russia
Key FSIL requirements, restrictions and exemptions
Under the FSIL, the acquisition of control by a foreign investor (or a group of affiliated
persons to which the foreign investor belongs), directly or through third parties, over
a Russian strategic company is generally subject to an advance approval by a special
governmental commission chaired by the Prime Minister (the Commission). In addition,
the 2014 FSIL Amendments extend the application of the FSIL to (1) acquisitions of
rights of ownership, possession, or use of fixed production assets representing 25 per cent
or more of the balance sheet value of assets of a Russian strategic company, as well as
(2) any arrangements enabling foreign investors to obtain rights to determine corporate
decisions of such a company.
Subsequent approval is required if a change of control happens as a result of
buy-back or redemption of shares, conversion of preferred stock into voting shares or for
similar reasons.
The FSIL also requires foreign investors to notify the Federal Antimonopoly
Service of Russia (the FAS), which administers the clearance procedure under the FSIL,
of any acquisition of 5 per cent (or more) of voting rights in a Russian strategic company
within 45 days of the acquisition. In line with the prior FAS practice, the 2014 FSIL
Amendments explicitly established that the applicants shall notify the FAS regarding
completion of the transaction previously approved by the Commission in accordance
with the FSIL.
The FSIL expressly prohibits sovereign states or entities under their control
(such as sovereign wealth funds) to acquire (1) direct or indirect control over a Russian
strategic company or (2) rights of ownership, possession, or use of fixed production assets
representing 25 per cent and more of the balance sheet value of assets of the relevant
strategic company – the Commission cannot waive this rule. Within these limits, minority
sovereign investments into the equity of strategic companies are allowed, subject to prior
approval if the relevant equity thresholds are exceeded (which may be as low as 5 per
cent).
Moreover, the FIL extends the application of the FSIL approval requirements
to sovereign investments in a non-strategic Russian company, if the sovereign acquirer
would exercise direct or indirect control over more than 25 per cent of voting rights in
such Russian company.
There are several exemptions from the FSIL jurisdiction. One set of exemptions
relate to a foreign investor adding to an existing, approved investment in a strategic
target. With respect to most strategic targets, no clearance is needed when the foreign
investor already controls the target by virtue of a FSIL-cleared investment.
However, in
the case of a ‘strategic mining company’ (i.e., a company with a licence for a subsoil field
of federal importance), that exemption in narrowed to the situation where the foreign
investor already holds over 75 per cent of the voting rights of the target (unless the
Russian state holds over 50 per cent of the voting rights of the target, in which case the
foreign investor can make its further investment without FSIL-clearance so long as such
further investment does not change such voting power of the Russian Federation in
the strategic target); this exemption is unavailable for investments into strategic mining
companies by sovereign acquirers. Another exemption establishes that where a foreign
acquisition vehicle is used that is ultimately controlled by a Russian citizen and tax
resident with no dual citizenship no FSIL clearance is required.
666
. Russia
Notion of control under the FSIL
The FSIL uses a robust definition of control. In addition to clear-cut situations such as
the acquisition of over 50 per cent of voting shares or the right to appoint over 50 per
cent of the members of the management bodies of a strategic target, control may exist
in other less obvious situations. Under the FSIL, control may also exist where a foreign
investor has less than 50 per cent of votes, but the allocation of votes is such that the
foreign investor is still able to determine the decisions of a strategic company. For
example, in the FAS v.
Telenor et al case, the FAS asserted that the largest, 40 per cent
shareholder (Telenor, the telecommunications conglomerate controlled by Norway) had
control over publicly traded VimpelCom, one of the largest Russian telecom companies,
despite the fact that there were other shareholders with significant shareholdings in
VimpelCom.34 Further, according to published guidelines by the FAS, there is no de
minimis (safe harbour) equity threshold (for example, 10 per cent) and control might be
acquired with no equity stake.35
Moreover, a lower threshold of ‘control’ applies for strategic mining companies:
the ability (directly or indirectly) to control 25 per cent of a mining company’s votes,
and any subsequent acquisition of shares in a strategic mining company is subject to
additional prior approval, unless the relevant size of the stake to overall equity does not
increase.36
The 2014 FSIL Amendments introduce a notion of ‘collective control’ over a
strategic company as control of several foreign investors, which do not form a ‘group
of persons’ but are directly or indirectly controlled by foreign states, international
organisations and (or) entities under their control and are able to dispose of more
than 50 per cent (and, in certain cases, even less than 50 per cent) of voting rights in
a strategic company. This particular amendment appears to build on the TeliaSonera
case of 2010 where Russian courts ruled that Sonera Group was indirectly ‘collectively’
controlled by foreign states (Sweden and Finland). As a result, the JV agreement
structured so that Sonera Group would acquire a substantial stake in MegaFon, a major
Russian telecom company, was declared void due to its violation of the FSIL.37
Clearance process
The FSIL clearance process comprises two stages.
At the initial stage, the FAS determines
whether the applicant would acquire control over a strategic entity as a result of the
reported transaction. Upon the results of the initial review, two alternative options are
34
35
36
37
Ruling of the Moscow Commercial Court in Case No. A40-57614/12-56-542 of
24 April 2013, upheld by Resolution of the Ninth Commercial Appellate Court of
28 September 2012.
FAS Guidelines on 57-FZ of 6 December 2013 (FSIL Guidelines), available at: http://fas.gov.
ru/clarifications/clarifications_30428.html (in Russian), Item 4.
FSIL Guidelines, Item 3.
Resolution of the Ninth Commercial Appellate Court in Case No.
A40-40521/10-22-354 of
21 October 2010, upheld by Resolution of the Federal Commercial Court of the Moscow
District of 21 February 2011 and Ruling of the Supreme Commercial Court of 22 June 2011.
667
. Russia
possible. If the FAS determines that either control would not be acquired or the target
is not strategic, it should inform the applicant that the FSIL approval is not required.
Alternatively, if the FAS determines that the applicant would acquire control over a
strategic entity, the FAS follows a standard, full-scale review, and the application is
referred to the Commission.
In case of a standard, full-scale review, while processing the application, the FAS
liaises with other agencies, including the Federal Security Service and the Ministry of
Defence, which shall provide their opinions to the Commission regarding the proposed
transaction from the perspectives of state defence and national security. The Commission,
however, makes the final decision. The FSIL does not establish specific criteria that should
be applied by the Commission,38 which thus has full discretion in determining whether
the transaction constitutes any possible potential threat to national security interests.
The
FSIL does not envisage any possibility for the applicant to participate in the approval
process (other than making the filing and responding to follow-up requests by the FAS)
or any grounds to challenge the Commission’s decision. If the transaction was approved
by the Commission it may be consummated within the term specified in the decision.
This term can be prolonged by the decision of the FAS upon the applicant’s request.
While the statutory deadline for an application review is three months (which may
be extended to six months in exceptional cases), in practice the FSIL approval process
can take longer. The FAS will suspend its review of the related antitrust filing and will
not issue its approval under the Competition Law until the FSIL clearance is granted.
As of June 2015, of the 372 applications submitted under the FSIL since its
enactment in 2008, 180 applications were reviewed by the Commission.
Only
10 applications were denied and 169 applications received positive clearances by the
Commission, of which 44 approvals were given subject to conditions usually set forth in
mitigation agreements. 137 applications were returned by the FAS because no approval
was required, 40 applications were withdrawn by applicants and 15 applications were
still under consideration.39 So far, only one FAS decision premised on the FSIL has been
challenged by an acquirer,40 and no decision of the Commission has been challenged.
Violations of the FSIL
Failure to comply with the FSIL can lead to severe consequences. A transaction
consummated in breach of the FSIL filing requirements or prohibition is void and may
be unwound (in other words, the parties returned to status quo ante).
This may also
potentially lead to voidance of any and all post-investment decisions of the shareholders
38
39
40
FSIL merely requires FAS to check a number of factors with respect to a strategic target,
such as whether it has IP rights in relation to technologies important for social, economic or
national defence and security (critical technologies), the licence to conduct works using state
secret data and other factors.
Source: www.fas.gov.ru/analytical-materials/analytical-materials_31194.html (in Russian).
Resolution of the Federal Commercial Court of the Moscow District in Case No.
A40-120785/12-120-1184 of 21 October 2013, upheld by Ruling of the Supreme
Commercial Court No. 798/14 of 4 April 2014.
668
. Russia
or governance bodies of the strategic company. Other potential consequences include the
loss or suspension of voting rights41 attached to the acquired interest and administrative
fines between 500,000 and 1 million roubles for companies.42
The FAS is authorised to prosecute FSIL violations. When applying to a Russian
court to unwind an acquisition violating the FSIL, the FAS usually applies – ex parte
– for interim relief broadly aimed at blocking cash disbursements from the strategic
company to the acquirer and its affiliates, preserving the existing management of the
strategic company and prohibiting approvals of major and interested party transactions
to be entered by the strategic company.43 Moreover, as the ongoing litigation regarding
the Astrakhan Port shows, the FAS also utilises a robust arsenal to obtain evidence
supporting its position, such as intelligence reports by the Federal Security Service
evidencing concerted actions by foreign companies aimed at obtaining control over the
Russian strategic company.44 Finally, based on several cases, private parties may have a
cause of action under the FSIL to unwind a transaction entered into in violation of the
FSIL.45
V
SIGNIFICANT TRANSACTIONS, KEY TRENDS AND HOT
INDUSTRIES
As a result of a confluence of negative factors (i.e., the decline in global energy prices
combined with international economic sanctions imposed on Russia, with the result that
GDP growth in Russia slowed down in 2014 and turned negative in the first quarter
of 2015) the Russian M&A market in 2014 has been less than buoyant. In contrast to
previous years, the 10 largest Russian M&A deals46 in 2014 had no non-CIS principals.
The contraction of inbound foreign M&A (in value terms) and the prevalence of
domestic M&A, combined with the new ‘deoffshorisation’ concerns for domestic buyers
41
42
43
44
45
46
Ruling of the Ninth Commercial Appellate Court in case No.
A40-124526/11-138-1056 of
21 June 2012, upheld by the Ruling of the Moscow Region Commercial Court of
24 September 2012.
The Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation, Article 19.8.2.
Ruling of the Moscow Commercial Court in Case No. A40-57614/12-56-542 of
24 April 2012, upheld by Resolution of the Ninth Commercial Appellate Court
of 28 September 2012; Ruling of the Moscow Commercial Court in Case No.
A40-57614/12-56-542 of 23 May 2012, upheld by Resolution of the Ninth Commercial
Appellate Court of 16 November 2012; and Rulings of the Astrakhan Region Commercial
Court in Case No. A06-2683/2012 of 1 June 2012 and 16 July 2012.
Decision of the Astrakhan Region Commercial Court in Case No.
A06-2683/2012 of May
23, 2014 (currently pending on appeal).
See, for example, Resolution of Ninth Commercial Appellate Court in Case No.
A40-40521/10-22-354 of 21 October 2010, upheld by Resolution of the Federal Commercial
Court of the Moscow District of 21 February 2011 and Ruling of the Supreme Commercial
Court of 22 June 2011.
Source: KPMG, Russian M&A Market Review, 2014 (March 2015), p. 10.
669
. Russia
and generally the substantial role of state-affiliated counterparties resulted in continued
emergence of Russian law as the governing law in significant Russian M&A transactions.
In fact, what a few years ago started as an attempt to replicate foreign contractual M&A
concepts in the Russian law-governed documentation is now clearly visible as a distinct
and independent approach to Russian law documentation.
VI
FINANCING OF M&A: MAIN SOURCES AND DEVELOPMENTS
The forms of financing M&A deals commonly used in major foreign markets also apply
for a Russian M&A deal. Traditionally, the prevailing structures of equity holdings in
Russian businesses, which involve multi-layer offshore holdings, as well as the financial
infrastructure, including major Russian and Western investment banks working in the
Russian market, provided the flexibility of using multiple financing instruments.
Market intelligence reports that 40–50 per cent of cash payments in Russian
M&A deals in 2013 were debt-financed (the remainder being financed predominantly
with corporate cash reserves), consistent with the 2012 levels.47 Debt financing tends
to take the form of bank loans,48 and is occasionally in the form of leveraged buy-outs
(which require tax structuring). Sometimes acquisitions are funded with public debt –
for example, Eurobond issuances of US$1 billion and 15 billion roubles by Novatek,
Russia’s largest independent gas producer, helped to finance its US$1.4 billion purchase
price for Nortgas (acquired in June 2013). A notable trend is the active and large-scale
involvement of state-affiliated banks in financing Russian M&A transactions due to a
range of factors: their generally cheaper cost of financing, their proximity to M&A deals
on the advisory side, the prevalence of state-affiliated buyers in the domestic market and,
specifically in 2014, limited foreign borrowing opportunities for Russian borrowers in
light of the Ukraine-related sanctions.
At the peak period of the financial crisis in 2009, the share of direct state
investments in financing Russian M&A deals (among others, via Vnesheconombank,
the Russian development bank) exceeded 20 per cent, but had decreased by 2010 and
remained under 5 per cent in 2013.49 In view of the tightening liquidity conditions for
Russian borrowers, in 2014, the CBR came up with a new refinancing instrument for
Russian banks, which allows banks to use loans provided for certain investment projects
as collateral for obtaining financing from the CBR.
47
48
49
Source: ‘Review of M&A Deals – 2008-2013.
Structure and Financing of Transactions’ by
OJSC Gazprombank, January 2014 (excluding the financing for the Rosneft/TNK-BP deals).
More recent data is unavailable, although the percentage share of debt financing could have
somewhat decreased, as borrowing opportunities for Russian entities drained in 2014 in view
of the Ukraine-related sanctions.
Source: ibid.
Source: ibid.
670
. Russia
The private equity (PE) market in Russia is underdeveloped, as evidenced by its
moderate size50 and the changing composition of the players that make PE investments
in Russian assets from year to year. Prominent PE funds active in the Russian market
include TPG, Baring Vostok, the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), Rosnano
and the PE arms of Russian state-affiliated banks. The IPO of Lenta, Russia’s leading
hypermarket chain, in March 2014 in a secondary sale of the shares by TPG, VTB
Capital and the EBRD marked a classic partial monetisation of a very successful PE
investment.
In recent years, Russian government-backed sponsors (such as the RDIF and
PE divisions of state-affiliated banks) have strengthened the domestic segment of
PE investments in Russia, which is expected to continue to increase. The RDIF was
created in 2011 to catalyse PE investments in the Russian economy, including by way
of attracting foreign co-investors who would otherwise be reluctant to invest on their
own.51 The RDIF has participated in deals valued at 400 billion roubles, out of which
350 billion roubles was provided by foreign co-investors, partners and banks.52 In recent
years, private equity in the Russian M&A markets has focused on the consumer retail,
telecommunications and IT, financial services, and real estate sectors.
VII
EMPLOYMENT LAW
In Russia, executive compensation falls within the purview of employment law.
In
principle, the CEO of a Russian company can be dismissed at any time upon the
decision of the corporate body that has the relevant competence under the company’s
charter. Until recently, upon dismissal, the CEO of any Russian company was entitled
under law to compensation equal to three average monthly salaries or, if greater, in the
amount set forth in the CEO’s employment agreement. This is no longer the case for
certain state-controlled companies and all banks operating in Russia, as explained below,
and a question remains about whether other contractually agreed executive ‘parachutes’
could be curtailed in court.
Unlike in some other jurisdictions, executive compensation did not become
a hot topic in Russia at the time of the financial crisis.
However, a case that started
in 201353 and dealt with a ‘golden parachute’ of around 200 million roubles to the
dismissed CEO of the state-controlled company Rostelecom drew attention. Certain
50
51
52
53
In 2013, completed deals in respect of Russian businesses, which involved PE buyers or
sellers, reached US$2 billion, compared, for example, with Brazil (US$6.6 billion), India
(US$3 billion) and China (US$17.8 billion). More recent data is unavailable.
Source:
Thomson Reuters.
Source: http://rdif.ru/InvestModel/ (in Russian).
Source: http://rdif.ru/About/.
Decision of the Commercial Court of St Petersburg and the Leningrad Region in Case
No. A56-31942/2013 of 2 December 2013, ultimately upheld by Determination of the
Supreme Court No. 307-ES14-8853 of 30 March 2015.
The dismissed CEO received the
pay-out, but later returned around 75 per cent of it to Rostelecom.
671
. Russia
shareholders of Rostelecom challenged the board’s decision on the pay-out. The Supreme
Court has sided with the claimants, stating, among other reasons for its decision, that
compensation upon early termination must be consistent with its purpose (i.e., to be an
adequate protection for an ex-CEO upon his or her loss of employment) and, given its
amount, should have been well-justified by the company.
In February 2014, the Russian legislature reacted to this case by passing a law that
retroactively limited ‘golden parachutes’ to various categories of executives of companies
more than 50 per cent owned by the Russian Federation to three average monthly
salaries.54 Possibly, Russian courts may adopt a similarly restrictive approach to ‘golden
parachutes’ for outgoing executives of non-state owned companies (particularly, those
with public shareholdings), relying on the concepts of reasonableness, good faith and
best interests of shareholders.
Separately, new rules for the compensation in the banking industry (both in its
private and state-controlled segments) were adopted in 2013 and 2014.55 The CBR
now has supervisory powers over the executive compensation in all Russian credit
organisations. The new rules oblige credit organisations to implement a system of
compensation, including executive compensation, under which remuneration can be
cancelled, reduced or clawed back in case of a negative financial result of the entire
organisation or its individual business segment.
VIII TAX LAW
In late 2014, Russia adopted the law comprising the core part of the ‘deoffshorisation’
legislative package.56 Although the ‘deoffshorisation’ reform is principally carried out in
respect of taxation, it directly affects corporate aspects of structuring Russia-related M&A
transactions (traditionally structured via foreign jurisdictions) and corporate holdings of
Russian businesses and individuals, to the extent they rely on foreign companies, such
as SPVs, trading or cash management companies. This and other legislative measures
followed calls by Russian leadership to stimulate the relocation of de facto Russian
businesses, in particular their ownership structures, into the realm of Russian law and
Russian jurisdiction; such calls intensified in the first half of 2014.
In parallel, there are
efforts to make Russian corporate law more ‘user-friendly’ (such as the new rules on
54
55
56
Federal Law No. 56-FZ ‘On Amendments to the Labour Code of the Russian Federation
Regarding Introduction of Limitations on Severance Payments, Compensations and Other
Payments in Connection with Termination of Employment Contracts with Selected
Categories of Employees’ of 2 April 2014.
Federal Law No. 146-FZ ‘On Amendments to Selected Legislative Acts of the Russian
Federation’ of 2 July 2013; Instruction of the CBR No.
154-I ‘On Procedure of Assessment
of Compensation System in Credit Organisations and Procedure for a Directive to a Credit
Organisation on Curing Deficiencies in Its Compensation System’ of 14 June 2014.
Federal Law No. 376-FZ ‘On Amendments to Parts One and Two of the Tax Code of the
Russian Federation (With Respect to Taxation of Profits of Controlled Foreign Companies
and Revenues of Foreign Organisations)’ of 24 November 2014.
672
. Russia
corporate forms and institutions discussed above) so as to incentivise the use of Russian
corporate vehicles and Russian law by the business and legal community.
In Russia, tax advice, including for major M&A deals, is often provided by the
‘Big Four’ companies. We suggest the reader review their alert memoranda (available on
their websites regularly) on Russian tax law developments related to M&A activities.
IX
COMPETITION LAW
Russian competition law and practice, including merger control, have been developing
rapidly over the last decade. After administrative reforms in 2004, the Russian antitrust
regulator, the FAS, has achieved substantial and visible results in the enforcement of
Russian competition law and its evolution.57 Since the enactment of the Competition Law
in 2006 (which replaced the 1991 law), there have been three major sets of amendments
to the Competition Law. The fourth set of amendments has been debated for over two
years by the FAS, other Russian authorities and the Russian business community and it
is now pending with the Russian parliament undergoing further revisions between the
parliamentary readings.58
Generally modelled on EU competition law,59 the merger control rules of the
Competition Law require prior approval by the FAS for the incorporation and merger
of Russian business entities and the acquisition of equity in a business entity (Russian or
foreign with substantial sales into Russia) above certain acquisition thresholds, provided
that an asset or revenue test is met.60 In practice, given that asset or revenue tests consider
group assets of the acquirer and the target, the FAS’s approval is almost always required if
the acquirer takes over 50 per cent ownership at any level (including an offshore parent
of Russian operating subsidiaries).
For a minority investment, FAS approval is needed
to acquire over 25 per cent of voting shares in a Russian joint-stock company, over
one-third’s interest in a Russian limited liability company, or over 20 per cent of the
target company’s assets. An investment constituting less than 50 per cent of equity in an
offshore parent is not per se subject to FAS approval under the Competition Law.
57
58
59
60
For example, in recognition of this achievement, the Global Competition Review rated
FAS at the 17th place globally out of 140. Meeting with FAS Director Igor Artemyev,
17 June 2014 available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/22494 (in English).
Source: www.rg.ru/2015/03/31/paket.html (in Russian).
Russian Competition Law Textbook, ed.
by I Artemiev, S Puzyrevskiy and A Sushkevich
(2014), p. 37.
These asset/revenue tests are the following: (a) the combined asset value of the acquirer and
the target exceeds 7 billion roubles, and the total assets of the target exceed 250 million
roubles; (b) the combined annual revenues of the acquirer and the target for the preceding
calendar year exceed 10 billion roubles and the total assets of the target exceed 250 million
roubles; or (c) the acquirer, the target or any entity within the acquirer’s or the target’s group
is included in the FAS’s register of entities having a 35 per cent or larger market share for a
commodity. Acquisitions of assets located in Russia (as opposed to share deals) are subject to
separate thresholds for competition law clearance.
673
.
Russia
The general review period by the FAS is 30 days following the submission of the
complete application package. The FAS may extend this period for an additional 60 days
if it needs extra time to review the transaction and request additional information. The
FAS may do so if it believes that the transaction may restrain competition, for example,
as result of the establishment or an increase of the ‘dominant position’ of the acquirer.
The Competition Law also provides that the FAS may extend the review period in order
to determine conditions precedent for its approval of the reported transaction and set the
deadline for their satisfaction, which may not be longer than nine months. The FAS may
also suspend the review of the application pending the approval of the transaction under
the FSIL, if it finds that the transaction is subject to FSIL approval.
Upon review, the FAS
may clear the transaction without any conditions if there are no competition concerns;
issue its approval subject to behavioural conditions or divestiture remedies; or withhold
its approval (1) if the transaction may lead to the restriction of competition, including as
a result of the establishment or increase of the ‘dominant position’ of the acquirer, or (2)
if the FAS was not provided with requested information or the information provided was
inaccurate. Also, the FAS will withhold its antimonopoly approval if the FSIL approval
is not obtained.
X OUTLOOK
The outlook for M&A activity in the Russian market in 2015 remains unclear at the
time of writing. Western sanctions imposed as a result of events in Crimea and Ukraine
have had a chilling effect both on foreign investment in Russia and Western financing to
Russian businesses.
Significant foreign investment of a predominantly Western origin is
unlikely before the resolution of the situation in Ukraine and the de-escalation of wider
political tensions between Russia and the West. Despite long-standing expectations
that a strategic reorientation will facilitate greater Sino-Russian M&A activity, we have
not yet seen a major shift in that direction, as evidenced by relatively modest Chinese
M&A investments in Russia in 2014 (in terms of value and number).61 The government
privatisation plans that were announced in recent years have largely stalled. That said,
given the devaluation of the rouble, sustainable Russian assets might at some point
become attractive acquisition targets in M&A and capital markets.
Buoyancy is likely to
return to the Russian M&A market only when global energy prices turn bullish, which
they will inevitably.
61
Approximately US$1.1 billion worth of M&A investments in two deals in 2014, compared
with US$2 billion worth of M&A investments in four deals in 2013. Source: Thomson
Reuters.
674
. Appendix 1
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
SCOTT SENECAL
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLC
Scott Senecal has headed the Moscow office of the firm since 1996. Mr Senecal’s
practice focuses on financial and corporate law. Mr Senecal is consistently cited as
one of the leading lawyers in Russia by such publications as Chambers Global and The
European Legal 500. He regularly advises on M&A transactions and joint ventures,
representing foreign investors (both private equity and corporate) and Russian entities,
such as TPG (including investments in the food retail and banking sectors), Citigroup
Venture Capital (including investments in the real estate and warehousing sectors),
and Finmeccanica/Alenia (including its joint venture with Sukhoi to manufacture
and market the SuperJet-100).
Mr Senecal has advised on many significant securities
offerings by Russian corporates and banks such as the initial public offerings of Lenta,
Rosinter Restaurants and Wimm-Bill-Dann and equity and debt offerings by Gazprom
neft, Novatek, Sberbank and VTB. Mr Senecal joined the firm in 1989, became counsel
in 1999 and was elected partner in 2005. Mr Senecal received a JD degree, cum laude,
from New York University School of Law in 1987.
Mr Senecal is a member of the Bar
in New York.
YULIA SOLOMAKHINA
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLC
Yulia Solomakhina is a partner based in the Moscow office. Her practice focuses on
corporate and financial transactions, particularly capital markets, M&A and crossborder transactions involving businesses in Russia. Vedomosti, Russia’s leading business
newspaper, has distinguished Ms Solomakhina as a leading lawyer in Russia in the areas
of capital markets and M&A, the result of a survey of the leading legal practitioners in
Russia.
She has also been distinguished as a leading capital markets lawyer in Russia
by Chambers Global and Chambers Europe and in 2015 was named a ‘Rising Star’ in
Corporate by IFLR’s European Women in Business Law Awards. Ms Solomakhina’s
857
. About the Authors
recent experience includes advising MegaFon in its US$1.7 billion IPO on the London
Stock Exchange and the Moscow Exchange; NOVATEK in its US$1 billion Reg S/Rule
144A loan participation notes offering; Gazprom neft in its $10 billion Reg S/Rule 144A
MTN programme and debut US$1.5 billion Eurobond offering thereunder; and SAB
Miller in its strategic alliance with, and acquisition of shares in, Anadolu Efes. She joined
the firm as an associate in 2002 and became a partner in 2011. She received an LLM
degree from New York University School of Law in 2002 and a JD equivalent, summa
cum laude, from Moscow State University Law School in 2000. Ms Solomakhina is a
qualified Russian lawyer.
POLINA TULUPOVA
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLC
Polina Tulupova is an associate based in the Moscow office of the firm.
Her practice
primarily includes cross-border corporate and capital markets transactions, such as M&A
and equity and debt securities offerings, with a focus on financial institutions and natural
resources companies. Ms Tulupova also has extensive experience advising on regulatory
matters, including banking regulatory, foreign investments and competition law matters.
She joined the firm as an associate in 2010 and previously worked for four years as an
associate and stagiaire at the Moscow office of another US law firm. She received an LLM
degree from Harvard Law School in 2010 and graduated with a bachelor’s degree in law
(2004) and a master’s in law (2006), both with the highest honors, from the Moscow
State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO).
Ms Tulupova is a member of the
Bar of New York and a qualified Russian lawyer.
YURY BABICHEV
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLC
Yury Babichev is an associate based in the Moscow office of the firm. His practice
focuses on dispute resolution matters, including international arbitrations, cross-border
litigations and shareholder disputes, representing both sovereign and private clients.
Mr Babichev is also experienced in corporate and financial matters, including mergers
and acquisitions, group restructurings, securities offerings and syndicated loans. He also
has extensive experience advising on Russian regulatory matters, including competition
and foreign investment laws.
Mr Babichev joined the firm as an associate in 2008 after
working in the firm as a paralegal and a stagiaire from 2005 to 2008. He received an
LLM degree from Columbia Law School in 2010, where he was a Harlan Fiske Stone
Scholar, and a JD equivalent, summa cum laude, from Moscow State University Law
School in 2007. Mr Babichev is a qualified Russian lawyer.
His admission to the Bar of
New York is pending.
ALEXANDER MANDZHIEV
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLC
Alexander Mandzhiev is an associate based in the Moscow office of the firm. His practice
focuses on corporate and financial transactions, particularly equity and debt securities
offerings and mergers and acquisitions. Mr Mandzhiev joined the firm as an associate
in 2008 after working in the firm as a paralegal and a stagiaire from 2006 to 2008.
He
received a LLM degree from the University of Chicago in 2010 and a JD equivalent,
858
. About the Authors
summa cum laude, from Moscow State University Law School in 2007. Prior to joining
Cleary Gottlieb, he practised as a trainee lawyer in PricewaterhouseCoopers CIS Law
Offices BV from 2005 to 2006. Mr Mandzhiev is a member of the Bar of New York and
a qualified Russian lawyer.
CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLC
Paveletskaya Square 2
Building 3
Moscow 115054
Russia
Tel: +7 495 660 8500
Fax: +7 495 660 8505
www.clearygottlieb.com
859
.